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Hypothetical Justifications
Abstract:
A basic conviction in moral non-cognitivism is: only hypothetical norms may be justified.
Hartmut Kliemt argues for a moderate variant: there are only hypothetical justifications
of norms whether the norms are hypothetical or categorical in kind. In this paper the con-
cept of ‘hypothetical justification’ is analyzed. It is argued that hypothetical justifications
are not of the kind that we should look for in normative ethics.
1. Introduction
This essay is a critical investigation of a metaethical claim that Hartmut Kliemt
has most strongly defended and carefully discussed in many papers and books
throughout at least the last 23 years. The thesis is: any valid justification of
a norm is ‘hypothetical’ in the sense that it is inevitably relative to some set of
aims, values or normative convictions held by the addressee of the justification.
I shall argue: if this thesis is true, i.e. if only hypothetical justifications of moral
norms are valid, then no justification of any moral norm is possible in the rel-
evant sense. I will first give a short sketch of Hartmut Kliemt’s argument, the
context in which he usually presents it, and some aspects of its development
(2). My argument will then be based on some general considerations about jus-
tification of moral norms in general and hypothetical justification in particular
(3). The argument then proceeds by pointing out a necessary condition for any
justification of a norm: it must provide us with justified claims on other persons.
Hypothetical justifications do not meet this condition (4). I will conclude with
some tentative remarks on how justifying norms beyond hypothetical justifica-
tion might be rationally possible. These remarks itself are inspired by some of
Hartmut Kliemt’s more general reflections on moral theory.
Some may think it unsuitable to criticize a fundamental argument of a per-
son in an essay in honor of that person. I do not think that they are right, and I
believe Hartmut Kliemt will agree with me. In general, it seems to me, critique
is the most valuable acknowledgment a person in our business can get. More-
over, in this particular case, the criticism is rooted in a philosophical perspective
that—as the reader might notice—is Kliemtian at its foundations in different
important respects.1
1 A personal note: Many have learned from Hartmut Kliemt in reading his publications or dis-
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2. Justificatory Relativism
A central theme in Hartmut Kliemt’s philosophy is the relationship between
normative economics and ethics. At first sight there seems to be an irreconcil-
able divide between the two. Following the basic assumptions of neo-classical
economics as characterized in Robbins (1935) the science of economics has to
remain silent on ultimate ends and values. There simply is no scientific way to
bridge the gap between Is and Ought. This is not to say that normative matters
are in principle beyond the horizon of neo-classical economics. But from an eco-
nomic point of view any normative argument has to start from some normative
premises, which ultimately cannot be justified by scientific argument. However,
no justification for such ultimate normative premises is in fact needed. These
premises are actually found as social facts in the form of individual ends or so-
cially accepted values and norms. The economist will typically take these ends,
aims or values as a given and then consider, which rule or course of action will
be best, given these premises. So, as Hartmut Kliemt expresses it: “The neo-
classical economist tends to believe that rational normative argument is con-
fined to pointing out means-end relationships.” (Kliemt 2009, 51)
In contrast, most philosophers think that reason can be practical beyond in-
strumental rationality. One of the most prominent tasks of philosophical ethics,
these philosophers believe, is to define, investigate and systematize the funda-
mental rules of moral conduct. The basic conviction is that theses rules are
in fact open to rational investigation in general, and that it is in particular—
at least in principle—possible to give universally valid rational justification for
them. So, if economists are right, these philosophers are trying to do something
that is impossible within a rational and scientific approach to the world.
In a paper published in 1986, Kliemt discusses this problem as an indication
of a central meta-ethical debate, namely the debate between cognitivism and
non-cognitivism.2 Kliemt defines non-cognitivism as the conviction, that “[...]
all justifications of norms have to show that the observance and/or enforcement
of the norms can be expected to be instrumental to reaching given individual
aims, desires, ideals etc. [...]. All justifications of norms must be based on such
means-ends relationships.” (Kliemt 1986, 220) In this sense the non-cognitivist
claims “[...] that there are only hypothetical imperatives” (Kliemt 1986, 219).
Non-cognitivism is the position generally held by economists. It holds that “the
cussing matters with him. I am his disciple in a much more fundamental way. He brought me
into philosophy. He has always been a perfect teacher, a patient and most stimulating discus-
sant and a caring friend to me. Whatever I know about philosophy—if I do know anything about
it—I know from him. If I have ever written anything interesting or anything even right on philo-
sophical matters it originates in his teaching. This is not to say, of course, that he is responsible
for all the shortcomings and mistakes in my thought, they are exclusively mine. His outlook on
philosophy is my model and what I learned from him my fundament. But thought, although orig-
inating in similar perspectives and based on the same ground may evolve in different directions
in different persons. This, I think, makes it even more exciting.
2 Much of the general argument can already be found in his Habilitationsschrift (Kliemt 1985). See
especially parts D and E.
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justification of norms is entirely relative to a presupposed ‘is’ of individual de-
sires, aims, etc. [...]” (Kliemt 1986, 224).
In contrast, “[t]he cognitivist claims that there are some justifications of at
least some norms which in the last resort entirely stem from knowledge. They
are knowledge-based, in that they are not moored to some given aims, desires
etc. The insights showing that these norms hold true do not reduce to in-
sights into merely instrumental relationships. [...] The justifications are also
not merely relative to an addressee. The ultimate justification of at least some
norms does not depend on an ‘is’ or on the fact that some aims, desires etc. as a
matter of fact are shared by the addressee(s) of the justification.” Cognitivists,
thus hold, “[...] that there are some categorical norms and some categorical jus-
tification of norms” (Kliemt 1986, 221).
This distinction of non-cognitivism and cognitivism is a prominent theme in
several later papers, in which Kliemt discusses the fundament of normative the-
ory and the relationship of ethics and normative economics (1990, 1992, 1997).
Although the distinction runs parallel to a difference in attitude towards nor-
mative theory that divides economists as a matter of fact from the majority of
philosophers, Kliemt argues that it, nevertheless, does not justify a principle di-
vide between the two disciplines. For, if non-cognitivism is true then economic
methods are “appropriate to analyse all ethical problems that can be subject to
rational discussion”. Thus ethics should be part of economics. Otherwise, if “[...]
there is a legitimate claim of ethical theory to provide knowledge of categori-
cal claims of absolute ethics, then these claims about absolute ethics should be
incorporated like other parts of knowledge provided by scientific neighbors into
economics” (Kliemt 1990,13f.). Thus, either way, ethics and normative economics
should go along the same route.
From this argument it may seem that the distinction is only a secondary de-
tail in the determination of the relation between ethics and economics. But, al-
though his words are cautiously chosen and he is rarely explicit in this regard3,
it is very clear from his argument throughout that Kliemt strongly endorses
non-cognitivism. In the end, he thinks, normative economics rightly sets the
standards of normative theory and ethics should conform to it.
At least four kinds of arguments in favour of non-cognitivism may be found
in his writings:
1. He argues that the usual objections against non-cognitivism are either
misguided or point to general difficulties, which any meta-ethical theory
would face and which in particular cognitivism would face as well;4
2. he points to the fact that it is very hard to understand how it could be
possible to justify a positive value statement independently of actual eval-
uations of individuals;5
3 The most explicit statements of his position are to be found in Kliemt 1992 and in the last para-
graph of Kliemt 2009.
4 e.g. Kliemt 1990, 30ff.; 1992, 96ff.; 1997, 161ff..
5 e.g. Kliemt 2009, 57; 1992, 96.
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3. he positively argues that non-cognitivistic ethics can give a reasonable ac-
count of all actual practical problems of moral conduct;6 and, finally,
4. he indicates that the metaphysical, epistemological and ontological bur-
dens of non-cognitivistic ethics are minimal as compared to cognitivism.7
In a recent paper (2009), Hartmut Kliemt gives a new exposition and a re-
formulation of his theory. This new exposition is characterized by a change in
the basic conceptual framework and by some additional remarks clarifying the
concept of a hypothetically justified norm.
The conceptual change concerns the concept of cognitivism. Cognitivism is
here defined as the epistemological view that it is possible (at least in princi-
ple) to gain knowledge about moral values or norms. Kliemt now argues that
cognitivism thus defined may well be consistent with the methodological thesis,
that a rational justification of a norm is necessarily relative to given aims, ends
or values shared by the addressee of the justification. Even though a person
“might believe in the existence of values that can in principle be ‘objectively’ as-
certained” (Kliemt 2009, 51) his standard of a valid normative argument may,
still, demand justification relative to the normative convictions of its addressee
on principle. Therefore the position formerly characterized as non-cognitivism
is now termed ‘justificatory relativism’ leaving the traditional debate between
cognitivism and non-cognitivism aside.8
The additional remarks in the new exposition are concerned with a seem-
ingly obvious objection to Kliemt’s theory. This objection points to the fact that
many norms, which are almost universally accepted as valid, are categorical in
character. A typical example would be the promising norm. The promising norm
demands a certain way of conduct just because a promise was given and inde-
pendently of whatever the aims or values of the addressee of the norm may be.
So the promising norm is a categorical norm. Moreover, as David Hume already
showed, it is just this categorical form of the norm that makes it the basis of
a useful social institution. Just and only because it is absolutely obligatory to
keep one’s promises whether one may wish to do so or not, the norm can form the
fundament of a mutually advantageous social practice in the exchange of goods
or services. The same seems to apply to many other moral norms. They are fun-
damentally categorical, and it is their very categorical character that renders
them useful. Thus, it may be argued, such categorical norms do, as a matter of
fact, represent an essential part of morality as an existing social institution. But
a theory that claims that norms cannot be justified without reference to existing
aims and values seems to be incapable of giving an account of such categorical
norms, and, therefore, such a theory seems fundamentally inadequate.
6 e.g. Kliemt 1990, 29f., 35; 2009, 68f.; 1992, 99, 103.
7 e.g. Kliemt 1990, 17.
8 As will become clear from the argument below justificatory relativism in the given sense is in fact
a non-cognitivistic position. Still, the term ‘justificatory relativism’ seems to suit the essence of
Kliemt’s position better than ‘non-cognitivism’.
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Kliemt answers this possible criticism by elaborating on two distinctions
that he had already pointed to in his earlier writings. First, he argues, one
should carefully distinguish the demand that a moral norm be justified from the
demand that the norm itself makes on the addressee of the norm. With this
distinction of different demands that may be discussed in the context of moral
norms goes a distinction between the addressee of the norm and the addressee
of a justification of the norm. The addressee of a justification of a norm may
also be an addressee of the norm but the two different possible roles—addressee
of norm justification and addressee of the norm itself—do not necessarily coin-
cide. Now, the theory proposed is concerned with the justification of norms only.
It claims that justification requires reference to the aims and values of the ad-
dressee of the justification; there is no corresponding claim with regard to the
addressee of the norm. So it maybe—and in fact is—possible to give a hypothet-
ical justification of a norm with a categorical demand on the addressee of the
norm. In fact, the Humean argument in favour of the promising norm gives a
prominent example of such a justification: the usefulness of a social institution
based on the categorical norm is a good reason for most individuals to wish that
the norm be generally regarded as valid and be complied with. So in an attempt
to justify the norm to such a person one may point to this very wish and, thus,
give a hypothetical justification—relative to the interests of the addressee of the
justification—of a categorical norm. It is a fallacy—the justificatory fallacy—,
argues Hartmut Kliemt, to infer from the fact that a norm makes a categorical
demand that only a categorical justification, i.e. a justification the validity of
which is independent of the normative convictions of the addressee of the justi-
fication, for that norm can be given.
This argument illuminates an important aspect of the terms ‘hypothetical’
and ‘categorical’ as used by Kliemt. Clearly, the terms originate in Kant‘s moral
philosophy. But Kant obviously introduced the distinction to point out the dif-
ferent forms of demand a moral norm or imperative may put on us. In the
Groundwork he gives the following definition:
“All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically.
Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be practi-
cally necessary as a means to the attainment of something else
that one wants (or that one may want). A categorical imperative
would be one that represented an action as itself objectively nec-
essary, without regard to any further end.” (Kant 2002, 216)
Obviously the relationship between the action commanded by the imperative
and the aims and interests of the addressee of the norm makes the difference.
Kliemt agrees with this distinction and he also endorses its importance. But he
concentrates his argument not on different forms of command as expressed in
moral norms but on the validity of different forms of argument in the justifica-
tion of norms. In this context ‘hypothetical’ is a property of a justification, not,
as Kant used the term, a property of a norm. So we actually have two distinct
concepts of ‘hypothetical’ (and correspondingly of ‘categorical’), one originating
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in Kant’s philosophy the other defined and introduced by Kliemt in his argument
for justificatory relativism. Whereas in some of his very early writings Kliemt
encouraged the confusion between the two distinct concepts by sometimes using
the expressions ‘hypothetical norms’ and ‘hypothetically justified norms’ inter-
changeably (e.g. 1986, 221), he finally keeps them well apart. So will I in the
following: the term ‘hypothetical norm’ will exclusively refer to a norm with a
demand hypothetical to its aims, values and interests of the addressee of the
norm whereas the term ‘hypothetically justified norm’ without exception refers
to a norm justified relative to the ends and values of the addressee of the norm
justification.
3. Hypothetically Justifying Norms
A norm is justified if there is a valid argument to justify the norm. Before delv-
ing into a closer examination of the justification of norms it seems appropriate
to distinguish justifying norms from justifying acts or justifying deontic judge-
ments in a particular case (maxims). An act or a maxim to do a certain act in a
particular situation is justified by giving good reasons for the act or maxim. As
a rule among these reasons are norms. Kant, in fact, thought that any genuine
justification of a maxim must refer to some practical rule or norm. I think he
was right in this respect (see Lahno 2007). Whatever the case may be, if among
the reasons for an action is a norm, this reason is a good reason and can in fact
justify the act only if the norm itself is justified. Thus, in this regard, justifying
a norm has priority over justifying acts.
Kliemt’s argument is roughly the following: any justification of a norm is
necessarily addressed to a person. Someone justifies the norm to the addressee
of his justification. The only way to do this is by taking up and starting from
the aims, values and normative convictions of the addressee. Therefore any
valid justification of a norm must be relative to the preferences and normative
convictions of some addressee, and, thus, only hypothetical justifications may be
valid justifications of a norm.
Two ways of justifying a norm by reference to the aims and values of a person
may be extracted from Hartmut Kliemt’s argument:
(J1) An act of the addressee in compliance with the norm results in his aims
and values being optimally realized: the norm is a hypothetical impera-
tive (in the classical Kantian sense) based on a valid means-end relation.
The norm is justified relative to the aims of the addressee (and in this
case the addressee of the justification is identical with the addressee of
the justification).
(J2) The general acceptance of and compliance with the norm by the addres-
sees of the norm results in an optimal realization of the ends and values
of the addressee of the justification of the norm: the norm is an impera-
tive (possibly categorical), the general acceptance of which is a suitable
Hypothetical Justifications 73
means to realizing the ends and values of the addressee of the justifica-
tion.
The two ways of justifying norms relative to aims and values may seem very
similar but they can and should be carefully distinguished. Notice, first, that
the addressee of the norm necessarily coincides with the addressee of the justi-
fication in (J1) whereas in (J2) the addressee of the justification maybe a person
that is not directly addressed by the norm. However, at first it may seem that
the two ways of justification embody basically the same fundamental principle of
justification applied on different levels of argument only. One may even suspect
that (J2) is simply an application or an implication of (J1). But neither of these
suppositions is true.
Before discussing the point in more detail let me make some more general
remarks about the concept of justification. What is a valid justification of a
norm? There is no ultimate and generally acknowledged answer to this question.
But there is no ultimate and generally acknowledged answer to the question
what a valid justification of a descriptive statement or belief is either. However,
in both cases there is at least some agreement on some necessary and some
sufficient conditions of a justification being valid.
One way of justifying a norm is by deriving it according to the rules of deontic
logic from correct descriptive statements and valid (other) norms. This, I believe,
is in fact the most common way to justify a norm. Most cases of the actual social
practice of norm justification may, at least, be understood in such a way. (And a
similar case may be made for the justification of descriptive statements.)
However, there is a crucial vagueness in the characterization of this way to
justify a norm. What, one may ask, is the meaning of ‘valid’ here in ‘a valid
norm’? The answer to this question will decisively depend on the context of the
question. If the context is jurisdiction any positive legal norm and only positive
legal norms will probably be regarded as valid. In Ethics we seem to be looking
for a different, more fundamental foundation of norms.
In any way, it seems clear that ‘valid’ cannot only mean ‘justified in the de-
scribed way’ i.e. justified by reference to correct descriptive statements and valid
norms. This would inevitably lead us into an endless regress or into circular ar-
gument as the analogous sceptic argument shows in traditional epistemology. If
it is possible at all to give ultimate justifications of norms then either there must
be some other way to justify a norm or there must be at least some norms that
are valid without requiring further justification.9
These few general remarks signify the task set if we want to argue that a
norm is ultimately justified. We have to show that the norm can be derived from
other norms (and true factual statements), which either do not require justifica-
tion themselves, or which may be justified in different ways, i.e. not by deduction
9 The situation is very much the same in epistemology. In epistemology the view that there are
some descriptive statements that represent knowledge without requiring any further justification
is called fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is not very popular in our days. Most modern episte-
mologists are convinced that it is wrong and that there are in fact other ways to justify a belief,
especially ways that draw in some way or other on the concept of coherence.
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from valid norms and true factual statements. In the first case some convincing
or at least plausible argument is necessary that no further justification is in fact
needed. In the second case, we would have to provide some argument to show
the plausibility of the alternative principle of justification. The kind of argument
that suggests itself here is given by Rawls’ concept of reflective equilibrium.10
Having said this, we may now take a closer look at the two different ways of
hypothetical justification.
(J1) can be understood as saying that any norm is justified (relative to the
aims and values of the addressee) if it can be derived from a correct means-end
relation and the following basic norm:
(N1) Always choose the act which can be rationally expected to bring about the
best results as judged according to your aims and values.
Notice that the basic norm (N1) itself cannot be justified in the same way; that
would be circular. Moreover, (N1) is not a hypothetical norm. It does not only
address those individuals who generally want to do what serves their interests
best but also those, who believe that there are moral constraints that hinder
them now and then to act in such a way, and those who are insecure in this
respect. So if this is the basic idea of hypothetically justifying norms there is
at least one categorical norm and there is, thus, at least one categorical norm
without a hypothetical justification.
One can avoid this problem by—instead of trying to reduce every moral norm
to one basic norm—formulating a meta-ethical principle:
(P1) Every moral norm prescribing that a person P with aims and values Z
in a situation of form S should choose an act (of the kind) H is justified
relative to P and Z, if according to a correct means-end relation act H
assures optimal realization of Z for P in S.
It seems to me that Hartmut Kliemt—if he is willing to endorse (J1) at all—is
thinking of such a meta-ethical principle of justification. But, then, some argu-
ment that (P1) is a correct or valid principle is needed. The fact that P will nor-
mally appreciate following the norm (because, as a matter of fact, P is presumed
to be instrumentally rational in the classical sense) does not provide a good ar-
gument. For ‘to want something’ is fundamentally (and categorically) different
from ‘to be obliged to do something’. It is the very question, whether one should
always and only do what one wishes to do as an instrumentally rational individ-
ual. This is what is to be justified! Therefore, it is by no means clear that—as
Kliemt notes—“the justification of imperatives expressing means-ends relations
[...] need not be more arbitrary than the derivation of some statement of fact”
(Kliemt 2009, 58). The only thing that is not more arbitrary than the derivation
of some fact is the justification of the means-end relation, but certainly not the
respective imperative that adds the crucial ‘ought’.
10 Rawls 1951; 1971; for a critical discussion see Hahn 2004.
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There are two ways to justify principle (P1) that suggest themselves. Either
(P1) can be shown to be intuitively clear and therefore does not need any further
justification. Or it can be shown that (P1) induces a plausible, fruitful and co-
herent reconstruction of our actual practice of moral judgement in the sense of
reflective equilibrium. But any attempt in one of these directions must fail. It
seems utterly implausible that it is morally justified for some person to torment
another person if he just likes to see that other person suffer. This just does not
accord with our mutual understanding of morality. Therefore, it is impossible
to find a reflective equilibrium that reconciles a theory accepting (P1) and our
considered moral judgements in cases like the one given.
If, by the way, the principle was correct, that would already imply that at
least one categorical norm is hypothetically justified: the basic norm (N1) is im-
plied by (P1)—and in this sense hypothetically justified—but—as argued
above—its demand is categorical.
If we turn to (J2) now, we can also try to reduce any justification according to
(J2) to a basic norm (N2):
(N2) In choosing your actions always follow some rule which a person P (the
addressee of the justification) in view of his aims and values wishes to be
or remain generally accepted (and, in this sense, “valid“).
This does not seem to be an acceptable candidate for a general basic norm, unless
the addressee of the norm (N2) and the addressee of the justification coincide:
(N2*) In choosing your actions always follow a rule, which you wish to be or
remain generally accepted.
(N2*) now very much sounds like the Kantian categorical imperative itself, and,
in fact, by arguments similar to those in the case of (N1) (N2*) would be a cate-
gorical imperative that is categorically (not hypothetically) justified.
Alternatively to formulating a basic norm, (R2) may be based again on a
meta-ethical principle:
(P2) Every moral norm N is justified relative to Person P with aims and val-
ues Z if general acceptance of and compliance with N result in an optimal
realization of Z for P.
This is a relativistic version of the basic principle of rule-consequentialism. As
(N2*) compared to (N1), (P2) seems much more plausible to me than (P1). Still,
as with (P1) I doubt that it can be justified either as being intuitively clear or
by arguing that it is part of an acceptable reflective equilibrium. (P2) would im-
ply the obviously unacceptable Norm (N2). Moreover, if (P2) was valid, someone
would, for instance, be morally justified relative to his own preferences to kill
other people just as he likes, if he wishes to do so and is able to protect his own
life sufficiently without the protection of a social norm against killing. Or, to
give another example, a person who, for some reason, lost his interest in coop-
erative relations would be (relative to his own preferences) justified in breaking
his promises that he gave in order to receive the support of others.
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It is instructive to examine the logical relationship between (P1) and (P2)
more thoroughly. (P2) does not follow from (P1): (P1) implies only that a norm
N*, which prescribes to choose suitable actions to install a norm N as a socially
effective norm, is justified relative to some Person P with aims or values Z, if
the general acceptance of and compliance with N is optimal for P according to
Z. It does not imply that N itself is justified, as (P2) would establish. (P2) would
follow from (P1) if an additional premise was true: The compliance with N (in
each individual case) is the best means to install N as a socially effective norm.
But, as is well known, establishing an effective social norm is a typical problem
of collective action with all the typical difficulties. So the premise will in general
not be true.
Moreover, (P1) and (P2) are inconsistent in the following sense:
It is not true that: For any Person P and any set of values and aims Z(P) P
may consistently have there is a System M of moral norms that simultaneously
meets the following conditions:
(1) If a norm N is justified relative to P and Z(P) according to (P1) then N is
justified in M.
(2) If a norm N is justified relative to P and Z(P) according to (P2) then N is
justified in M.
(3) There is no situation S and (kind of) act H such that a norm N1, which is
justified in M, demands doing H in S, whereas another norm N2, equally
justified in M, demands doing not-H.
The reason that not all conditions may simultaneously apply is obvious: one can
always construe a situation S in which person P has a constitutional interest
in the realization of a social norm that prescribes to do H in S (e.g. to keep
promises in S) whereas P actually has in S an action interest not to do H (to
break his promises).
Whoever wants to stick to (P1) as a general principle of moral justification
cannot at the same time hold that (P2) is a valid principle of justification. By
the threat of inconsistency he is forced either to restrict the validity of (P1) or of
(P2) or of both, e.g. by some priority rule.
4. Ethics at Large
Does that mean that the normative enterprise of neoclassical ‘Robbinsian’ eco-
nomics is inconsistent? Not necessarily. According to Robbins economics is the
attempt to find the best allocation of scarce resources that have alternative uses
as evaluated according to some given ends. Thus, economics can propose ‘means
to given ends’ but on ‘ends it must remain silent’. Following this kind of thought,
economics is primarily concerned not with the justification of norms but with the
proposal and—in this sense—justification of acts. It identifies the optimal action
relative to given ends by pointing out a suitable means-end relation. The prin-
ciple of such a ‘justification’ is the principle of instrumental rationality which is
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closely related to the basic norm (N1): choose the act which can be rationally
expected to bring about the best results as judged according to your aims and
values.
Economics is not concerned with the justification of (N1) or the related prin-
ciple of justification of acts. Its aim is to point out what instrumental rationality
would demand in certain situations. The principle of instrumental rationality is
taken as given in just the same way as the ends and values are taken as given.
Norms are justified in this framework because economics is, as any science, con-
cerned with general statements, and, thus, with generic acts. A generic act H
by a person P in situation S is instrumentally rational according to aims Z and
thus justified. Therefore—and in this sense—the norm: ‘Any person should do
H in a situation like S if his aims are Z’ is justified. But such a norm has no
independent role in prescribing or justifying an act H. It just represents in a
short and handy way what acts are warranted by instrumental rationality.
Institutional economics is, in fact, more directly concerned with norms. How-
ever, the institutional economist is concerned with norms as social institutions,
as a social fact. He analyzes these facts and gives advice how to set up moral in-
stitutions and preserve the corresponding social practices. He is not concerned
with justifying norms. In pointing out how to reach given aims by fostering
certain social norms he merely justifies certain acts (of fostering) as instrumen-
tally rational. The economist is not entitled and does, as a matter of fact, not
aspire to answer the question ‘do I have to keep my promises?’ by some state-
ment like: ‘yes, because promise-keeping is a justified norm, justified (for you)
because promise keeping is a useful social practice (for you)’. All he can do to
answer such a question is refer to the individual promise and say: ‘it depends
on what you want. Instrumental rationality tells you that you should keep your
promise if and only if this is conducive to your aims.’
It is unclear whether Hartmut Kliemt would want to go beyond this. The
way he talks about the justification of norms may suggest that he does. But he
is, of course, well aware of the difference between constitutional interests and
action interests, and the possible conflicts between the two (see, in particular,
Kliemt 1990, 27ff.). He, in fact, endorses the possibility that a person may wish
a certain norm to become socially effective and at the same time realize that
in the particular case it best serves his aims not to act in accordance with the
norm. So the norm is justified (for him) according to (P2) while at the same time
according to (P1) a norm with a claim to the opposite would also be justified (for
him). Referring to a Hobbesian11 distinction, Kliemt argues that such opposing
claims do not lead into inconsistency because the two normative claims refer to
different spheres of obligation. The norm justified according to (P2) refers to
our constitutional interests and commits us ‘in foro interno’ to the wish, that
the appropriate moral institution be realized, and to acts conducive to this aim.
In contrast, a norm justified according to (P1) directly refers to our operational
or action interests, and, thus, directly commits us ‘in foro externo’ to the acts
11 Hobbes 1985, 215.
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prescribed by the norm. Now, my particular act in some situation will usually
be insignificant for the realization of a norm.12 So I can consistently do both:
wish the norm be realized and do the best I can to achieve this aim and not
comply with the norm in the particular case.
“Ethics at large”, as Kliemt calls it, is concerned with justifying moral norms
according to (P2). It is a “theory of moral and legal institutions, focusing primar-
ily on our reason (in foro interno), not on our behavior (in foro externo)”.13 So,
moral theory is about what moral order we should prefer. It affects our beliefs
in the legitimacy of moral institutions, but it has no direct behavioral conse-
quences. Norms can be justified according to (P2) without committing us to the
corresponding behavior. These norms, that are justified in foro interno, are com-
mitting in foro externo only if and to the extent that following the norm in the
particular case is instrumentally rational. It may be instrumentally rational to
follow the norm for two sorts of reasons: either the norm is backed by effective
social sanctions or the individual is somehow motivated (e.g. by corresponding
‘values’) to act as the norm prescribes. But both conditions may not apply to a
person although that person wishes the norm to be socially effective and, thus,
the norm is justified for that person according to (P2).
But this has fatal consequences. A norm may be justified for—or relative to—
a person P without any normative demand on his following the norm. Thus, I
may be able to validly justify the promising norm to a person P without thereby
having a valid and justified claim on him that he should keep his promises to
me. I am justified in wishing, that he will act according to the norm; I can also
force him to keep his promises—if I can—; but the sole fact that the norm is
justified (for him!) is no reason for him to act accordingly and does not justify
my demand for compliance.
On can, of course, define ‘justification of a moral norm’ according to a prin-
ciple (P2) without any normative implication for the kind of acts the norm de-
mands. In fact, I would not deny that there is justification in the sense of being
able to say ‘the norm is justified’ after showing that making the norm socially
effective is instrumentally rational relative to given ends. But it seems clear to
me that this is not the kind of justification that we are looking for in moral the-
ory. A justification of a norm (whether relative to given aims or not) that does
not justify a demand to act according to the norm, is just no justification in the
relevant sense of moral theory.
By supporting and propagating a moral norm I put a claim on every single
addressee of the norm. Any sufficient justification of the norm must justify my
claim. If a norm cannot be justified to a person A then nobody whatsoever has
a right to demand compliance to the norm from A. But this is exactly what
moral justification should do: it should authorize us to demand compliance with
12 Compare Kliemt‘s discussion of the ‘veil of insignificance’ in Kliemt 1986b.
13 “‘Ethics at large’ ist eine Theorie moralischer und rechtlicher Institutionen, die zunächst auf
unsere Einsicht (in foro interno) und nicht auf unsere Verhaltensweisen (in foro externo) abzielt.”
(Kliemt 1988, 155; see also 1992, 96ff.)
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the norm. It is only because of this aspect of moral norm justification that the
concept of a moral right is intelligible at all.
Notice that, according to Kliemt’s argument, a categorical norm may be jus-
tified by a hypothetical justification, i.e. by reference to (P2), without the cate-
gorical claim expressed by the norm being justified too. In fact, it seems that no
categorical claim expressed by an ordinary14 moral norm at all can be justified
according to Kliemt’s argument, as any claim on what the addressee of the norm
is to do, any obligation can only be justified conditional on his action interests.
It is instructive to take a second look at the so-called justificatory fallacy on
this background. The incriminated derivation was:
(JF) If N is a categorical norm then there is no hypothetical justification of N.
As we have seen, (JF) is wrong if hypothetical justification is conceptualized
according to principle (P1): (N1) is a categorical norm justified by (P1). Moreover,
if hypothetical justification is conceptualized according to principle (P2), then
(JF) is also certainly wrong: almost any norm—hypothetical or categorical—can
be justified according to (P2) if suitable ends and values are presupposed.
So (JF) is obviously false. However, it seems very unlikely that anyone would
seriously advocate (JF). It is too obvious that people may wish that a categorical
norm becomes or stays socially effective and, thus, that the norm is justified
for them in this sense. Criticizing (JF) seems to miss the point. The real point
of disagreement is not about whether the kind of justification of a norm derives
from its kind of demand, it is rather what kind of justification is needed in moral
theory. Consider the following statement:
(T) A categorical norm cannot be morally justified by a hypothetical justifi-
cation (alone).
(T) does not contain any inference. It can be wrong, but it cannot be a fal-
lacy. Moreover, (T) is consistent with the premise that there are hypothetical
justifications of categorical norms: some hypothetical justifications just may
not qualify as moral justifications. Now, suppose that there is the following
necessary condition for a norm being morally justified:
(NC) If a norm is morally justified, then it expresses a justified demand on all
its addressees.
As I have argued (NC) is a sensible condition on the kind of justification needed
in moral theory (and practice). If it is accepted the following statement im-
plies (T):
(T’) A categorical demand cannot be justified by a hypothetical justification
of the norm expressing the demand (alone).
By arguing for the distinction of the different spheres of obligation Kliemt obvi-
ously endorses (T’). But he rejects (T). So he must also reject (NC). And there, I
think, he errs.
14 The statement is not correct for norms like (N2).
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5. Conclusion
According to Hartmut Kliemt only hypothetical justifications may be valid jus-
tifications of moral norms. I argued: if he is right, then no moral norm may be
justified sufficiently as required by moral theory and practice. So, in the end,
Kiemt’s view is non-cognitivist. There are no justifications of moral judgements
in the relevant sense, hence moral knowledge is impossible.
I did not argue that there are non-hypothetical or categorical justifications
of (some) moral norms. In fact, I do believe that this claim is true. But I must
admit that I do not have a conclusive argument to this effect. Quite surprisingly
Hartmut Kliemt himself indicates a promising route to such an argument. In his
recent paper (2009, 69) he concludes with some tentative remarks about moral
deliberation:
“[...] I believe that rational argument concerning practical matters
is possible. The differences between critical practical and criti-
cal theoretical dispute should not be overemphasized. A reflective
equilibrium may be thought after in comparable ways in the prac-
tical as well as in the theoretical realm.”
So there is hope that the reflective equilibrium method may allow for a justifica-
tion of practical claims that is comparable to justifications given for theoretical
beliefs and generally acknowledged as sufficient to ground theoretical knowl-
edge. Justifications of moral claims along this route would still be ‘relativist’ in
two respects:
1. There is no ‘objective’ value independent of actual evaluations. The search
for reflective equilibrium necessarily starts from our considered judgments
and evaluations as given in actual moral thought and practice. Without
such a foundation reflective equilibrium looses its anchor and all its justi-
fying force. Therefore the relativist contention that “[...] there is no value
unless there is an entity that as a matter of fact does value things” (Kliemt
2009, 59) is endorsed. But the relativist may very well be wrong in con-
cluding that values are necessarily values for somebody and entirely de-
pendent on his individual evaluations.
2. The acceptance of any justification based on the reflective equilibrium
method is conditional on taking a specific stance. First, to fully under-
stand and employ moral claims it is necessary for a person to adopt an in-
ternal point of view (Hart 1961) towards the claim; second, being a moral
person—acting and arguing as a moral person—presupposes that the per-
son takes a participant point of view (Strawson 1972) towards the people
he is interacting with.15 From an objective point of view and with an ob-
15 For the role of an internal point of view in moral discourse, see Kliemt 1978, 100. In On Eco-
nomics and Ethics (1990, 24) Kliemt indicates that a participant stance may provide a basis for a
universalistic moral theory.
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jective stance towards others moral deliberation may easily seem mean-
ingless and the search for reflective equilibrium may loose its point.
There is some truth in moral relativism: there does not seem to be objective
moral truths, independent of our actual evaluations and our ways of encoun-
tering each other as moral agents. But even then, morality is open to rational
deliberation. And the conviction that there are only hypothetical justifications
of moral norms, which presents morality basically as a matter of personal (and
possibly conflicting) interests, tastes and power, may very well be false.
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